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“I AM THE CREATOR”: BIRGITTA OF SWEDEN’S
FEMININE DIVINE
by Yvonne Bruce

Critical writings about Saint Birgitta of Sweden (1302/3–1373) adopt a
curious tone: the literature marvels at her wide-reaching political, ecclesiastical, and secular influence, remarkable for a woman even in an
age that saw Saint Catherine of Siena and Julian of Norwich achieve
religious authority while maintaining popular appeal. Yet this marvel is
checked by hesitation; surely no fourteenth-century mystic could have
achieved such authoritative status except as an orthodox agent of the
church, and historians have typically been cautious of seeing Birgitta as
a forerunner of the Reformation. Ingvar Fogelqvist, for example, is
reluctant to “judge the later Middle Ages through the viewpoint of the
Protestant Reformation,” yet his own study of “apostasy and reform” in
Birgitta’s Revelations reveals the saint’s struggles between old ideas
and “new reformatory ones.”1 Joan Bechtold attributes Birgitta’s
articulation of the feminine to “internal struggle, rather than ... simple
acquiescence” to a masculine ideology, but negates her “feminist victories” by asserting that she “rose to power by defending a system created
by men more fervently than did her male counterparts”; a few lines
later, Bechtold notes that Birgitta’s aristocratic background partly “explains the restraint she felt towards any subversive visionary or political
activity.”2
The critical dilemma confronting an interpreter of Birgitta’s life and
writings is twofold: how does one reconcile Birgitta’s zealous and
iconoclastic reform activities—which often affronted the papacy and
the Swedish monarchy—with her ostensibly orthodox goals and didac1
Ingvar Fogelqvist, Apostasy and Reform in the “Revelations” of St. Birgitta (Stockholm 1993) 17.
2
Joan Bechtold, “St. Birgitta: The Disjunction Between Women and Ecclesiastical
Male Power,” Equally in God’s Image: Women in the Middle Ages, ed. Julia Bolton
Holloway, et al. (New York 1990) 89, 88. And see Kari Elisabeth Børreson’s comprehensive essay, “Birgitta’s Godlanguage: Exemplary Intention, Inapplicable Content,” in
Birgitta, hendes værk og hendes klostre I Norden (Birgitta, her Works, and her Five
Abbeys in the Nordic Countries), ed. Tore Nyberg, Odense University Studies in History
and Social Sciences, vol. 150 (Odense 1991); Børreson believes that “Birgitta displays an
exemplary feminist intention. Nevertheless, the androcentric impact of Birgitta’s writings
makes her doct[r]inal content inapplicable” (23).
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tic Revelations? Second, how can one claim “feminist victories” for a
woman whose “background placed social and ecclesiastical limitations
on her ability to conceive of possibilities for women apart from male
structures”?3
The key to understanding Birgitta’s role lies in reevaluating the central features of her life’s work, the Revelations. Birgitta herself is the
chief subject and fulcrum of this visionary doctrine; thus, the work requires a reading that shifts critical focus from her role as church representative to her own self-fashioned agency.4 My purpose in this essay is
not to rescue Birgitta from charges of “antifeminism” nor to determine
whether she ultimately undermined or reinscribed patristic doctrine, but
to demonstrate her very indifference to these larger issues. The Revelations are radical because Birgitta puts herself at the very center of her
supposedly Christo-centric work, partaking of divine authority for her
own personal and female, as well as social and (proto)feminist goals.
She manages this in three primary and inseparable ways: by presenting
her revelations as the unmediated voice of God, a move that positions
her “as a prophet in the tradition of the Hebrew prophets”;5 in her
identification with Mary, whom she elevates to triune status; and
through the juridical motif that figures prominently in her visions, by
which she authorizes her own word as law. The Revelations indirectly
questions medieval notions of women’s relationship to church hierarchy because Birgitta remains self-consciously ignorant of female infe3

Bechtold (n. 2 above) 100.
This is, indirectly, an important point for Birgitta’s latest biographer, Bridget Morris,
who provides a complex definition of what Birgitta’s initial “calling vision” was not: it
was not for her sake, but “for the salvation of others. She was not to experience a mystical unio with God, in the manner of many of her predecessors ... Her role was essentially
as a conduit of moral guidance to other people and actively to participate in their salvation. The word ‘mystic’ is therefore less applicable to her than ‘visionary’ or ‘prophet’”
(St. Birgitta of Sweden, Studies in Medieval Mysticism, vol. 1 [Suffolk, Eng. 1999] 65–
66). See also F. R. Johnston, “The English Cult of St. Birgitta of Sweden” in Analecta
Bollandiana: Revue critique d’hagiographie 103.1–2 (1985) 75–93, at 76. Birgitta is
specifically a conduit, a conductor of “spiritual fluid,” and hence the importance to her
visions of her material self (Revelations, bk. 6.52.9–10 [see n. 18 below]). See also Marguerite Tjader Harris’s edition of Birgitta’s Vita, in Birgitta of Sweden: Life and Selected
“Revelations,” trans. Albert Ryle Kezel, intro. Tore Nyberg (New York 1990) 75 and 90,
for example; and Morris 66–67. This specific materialism is one of the distinguishing
features of the visions of medieval women and a crucial point of female spirituality for
Luce Irigaray (q.v.).
5
Claire Sahlin, “Gender and Prophetic Authority in Birgitta of Sweden’s Revelations,”
in Gender and Text in the Later Middle Ages, ed. Jane Chance (Gaineseville, FL 1996)
74.
4
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riority. Her writings thus anticipate the feminist strategy of, as Elizabeth Grosz expresses it, “indifference to [phallic authority] presented as
interest or commitment.”6
Birgitta’s revelations number approximately seven hundred, and
their editing history is exceptionally tangled. Birgitta dictated her
revelations in Swedish to her confessors, who transcribed them into
Latin; none of these transcriptions survive. There are extant two primary and mostly complete Latin manuscripts of the Revelations, as
well as numerous partial manuscripts (and seven extant Middle English
manuscripts, most of them probably translated from the Latin manuscript kept at Syon Abbey, the Birgittine order established at Twickenham, England, in 1415).7 Given this palimpsest of sacred material,
scholars are understandably reluctant to attribute specific utterances to
Birgitta or to determine which of the many voices speaking in the
Revelations belongs exclusively to her. And yet, it is impossible to
deny the consistency and urgency of the voices animating the Revelations. My goal in this essay is to observe the larger patterns of gendered
expression in the Revelations and, I hope, to suggest the ways in which
Birgitta’s forceful and distinctly female concerns show through the
overlay of masculine emendation. It is likely, for instance, that the most
significant textual revisions, undertaken by her confessor and “editorin-chief” Alphonso Pecha (at divine suggestion) were authorized and
directed by Birgitta herself before her death.8 The Revelations cleverly
“quarries male theology for women’s use,” as Birgitta was well aware
of the doubts about her authenticity expressed by both her spiritual tutor and primary confessor, Mathias Övidsson—with whom she parted
before leaving Sweden—and by the male-dominated clergy of which he
was representative.9
6

Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London 1990) 187.
See the manuscript history prefacing each book of the Revelations (n. 18 below); also
Morris (n. 4 above) 3–9 and 198–199; for the textual history of the Middle English manuscripts, see Johnston (n. 4 above) 79–80, and the first part of William Patterson Cumming’s introduction to his edition of The Revelations of Saint Birgitta, Early English Text
Society, no. 178 (London 1929).
8
Claire Sahlin makes the same point: because of the difficulty in determining the extent to which the visions and revelations are solely Birgitta’s, she is “examining textual
representations of issues concerning gender and authority in the Latin editions of the
Revelations and not necessarily Birgitta’s actual words” (“Gender and Prophetic Authority,” [n. 5 above] 72). Morris (n. 4 above) 6, uses the phrase “editor-in-chief.”
9
Quoted in St Bride and Her Book: Birgitta of Sweden’s “Revelations,” trans. from
Middle English by Julia Bolton Holloway (Newburyport, MA 1992) 10. Holloway’s
methods make many medieval scholars uneasy; I have relied on her chiefly for her recog7
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Birgitta is hardly alone among medieval women visionaries in using
God’s authority to advance her own doctrinal perspectives; it is the
inseparability of human and divine will that lends authority to the mystic—male or female—and the fascination of visionary literature comes,
in part, from tracing this tangle of personality and doctrine. Birgitta,
however, claimed far more for herself in her life and writings than any
other visionary woman. Unlike most mystics, she married and bore a
large family, beginning the Revelations upon her husband’s death
(1344) and continuing with it until her own in 1373. She came from a
powerful family with a tradition of legal practice and scholarship. Her
father, Birger Persson, was governor of Uppland, the seat of the Swedish monarchy; he rewrote Sweden’s pagan law code, the Vig Saga, to
reflect the country’s increasing Christianization. Birgitta’s maternal
grandfather belonged to the long-ruling Folkung family and was himself governor of East Gothland. Birgitta was related to the Swedish
monarchy and even tutored Queen Blanche; sections of the Revelations
address the royal couple’s extravagant lifestyle and Sweden’s role in
Continental politics. It was to King Magnus that Birgitta appealed for
help in establishing her Ordo Sanctissimi Salvatoris, the Order of the
Most Holy Savior. Magnus donated the royal castle at Vadstena for the
purpose and levied a tax to pay for additions and upkeep.10 It was for
this order that Birgitta wrote her Regula, or Rule, and the breviary for
the Vadstena nuns, Cantus Sororum, Song of the Sisters (consisting in
part of the Sermo Angelicus, the Angelic Conversation), both included
in the Revelations.
It seems clear that Birgitta drew upon her legalistic heritage in
framing her Revelations and in writing the Regula; in all her writing
she not only appropriated the masculine tradition of prophet but, according to Julia Bolton Holloway, created “a Swedish and European
Bible for the fourteenth century.” Holloway calls the Revelations “a
book of books,” and regarding the works written for her order, remarks
that Birgitta’s “is the first instance (except for Saint Clare) where the
woman writes the Rule and establishes the Order.”11 And, of course, no
nition of Birgitta’s mystical singularity—Holloway is one of the few students of the
Revelations to suspect their possibly subversive content. See Harris’s edition of the Vita
(n. 4 above) 78 and 80, on the spiritual state of Master Mathias.
10
See Helen M. D. Redpath, God’s Ambassadress: St. Bridget of Sweden (Milwaukee
1947), esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Johannes Jørgensen, Saint Bridget of Sweden, trans. Ingeborg
Lund, 2 vols. (London 1954) vol. 1, passim.
11
Holloway (n. 9 above) 125, 134.
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other medieval woman has inspired such consistent devotion; not only
did Birgitta’s Mariology spur Continental interest in the Virgin and,
further, enrich doctrinal debate about Mary’s status within the church,
but Birgitta’s Order of the Holy Savior at Syon Abbey is the only currently operating monastic order established by a medieval woman to
have remained functioning continuously since its founding (by Henry
V).12 Given Birgitta’s powerful presence in Continental politics,
spirituality, and papal reform, the words of Jesus that begin the Revelations take on a peculiar resonance: “I am the Creator of Heaven, I am
one in divinity with the Father and the holy Spirit” (“Ego sum creator
celi et terre, unus in deitate cum Patre et Spiritu sancto”).13 The Revelations repeatedly emphasizes Birgitta’s own status as virgin, bride, and
mother, strengthening her identification with Mary and mirroring the
Trinity that speaks through her. Her unmediated voice of God—the
insertion of the “I” that is both God and Birgitta—and her Trinitarian
exempla are thus related strategies of prophecy.
Luce Irigaray, in “Divine Women,” laments that there “is no woman
God, no female trinity: mother, daughter, spirit ... [woman] is fixed in
the role of mother through whom the son of God is made flesh ... the
virgin’s relations with the Father always remain in the shadow.” Irigaray is here speaking of a Christian tradition that values the feminine
only through its procreative link to the masculine, a relationship simultaneously devalued by the “amorphous, formless” (“amorphe, informe”) aspect of the womb.14 But Birgitta illuminates this relationship
12
See Morris (n. 4 above) 6, 171–172; and Neil Beckett, “St. Bridget, Henry V and
Syon Abbey” in James Hogg, ed., Studies in St.Birgitta and the Brigittine Order, 2 vols.
(New York 1993) 2.125–150, passim.
13
Revelations 1.1.1. Further references to the Revelations in the text and notes will be
cited by book, chapter, and verse numbers. The publication information for the books of
the Revelations, which are in various stages of availability in print and online, is as follows: Birgitta of Sweden, Revelaciones, bk. 1, ed. Carl-Gustaf Undhagen, Royal Academy of Letters History and Antiquities (Uppsala 1977); bk. 2, ed. Birger Bergh, St.
Birgitta of Sweden Website 1999, Editio Princeps (Lübeck 1492), critical edition in
preparation by Birger Bergh http://www.umilta.net/birgitta.html; bk. 4, ed. Hans Aili,
Samlingar utgivna av Svenska Fornskriftsällskapet [SFSS], ser. 2, Latinska skrifter, vol.
7.4 (Göteborg 1992); bk. 5: Liber Questionum, ed. Birger Bergh, The Royal Academy of
Letters History and Antiquities (Uppsala 1971); bk. 6, ed. Birger Bergh, SFSS (Arlöv
1991); bk. 8, ed. Arne Jönsson, St. Birgitta of Sweden Website 1999, Editio Princeps
(Lübeck 1492), critical edition in preparation by Hans Aili:
http://www.umilta.net/birgitta.html.
14
“Il n’y a pas de Dieu femme, ni de trinité féminine: mère, fille, esprit. Cela paralyse
l’infini du devenir femme dans la maternité et la tâche de l’incarnation du fils de Dieu ...
Ses rapports avec le Père demeurent toujours dans l’ombre.” In Luce Irigaray, Sexes et
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first through her emphasis on the Virgin as widow: “I was as a widow,
by the fact that I had a son on earth who did not have a fleshly father”
(“ego fui quasi vidua, eo quod habui filium in terris, qui non habuit
carnalem patrem,” 4.53.2). Birgitta/Mary is widowed another way, too:
through the death of the son, who is a manifestation of his heavenly
father, who in turn is Birgitta’s heavenly husband. One of Birgitta’s
most striking images of the triune motif, however, not only establishes
a female trinity, but also, in conflating it with the masculine, asserts its
authority: “If someone spoke through a pipe having three holes and said
to the one listening: Never out of this opening will you hear my voice,
he should not be blamed if afterward he spoke through the two remaining holes. Thus it is now in our speech. For although my mother
the virgin said that this was to be the final letter sent to the king [Magnus], so this is the message to be understood as referring to the king’s
own person. But now I God, who am in the mother and the mother in
me, send my messenger to the king.”15
In this extraordinary passage Birgitta rewrites gospel: God responds
here as Christ in John 14.10: “Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?”16 Not only does Birgitta substitute the
mother for the father, she also casts herself as messenger, as Christ
does in the context of the biblical passage: “the words that I speak are
not spoken of myself; it is the Father who lives in me accomplishing
his works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father is in me”
(10–11). Birgitta aligns herself with a divine Mary, with Christ the
messenger, and even with the voice of God—for who is the pipe but
Birgitta, a mute instrument till animated by divine afflatus? In this
complex image, then, not only are the Godhead represented, but also
the Birgittine trinity. And not only does the three-holed pipe imply
spiritual conflation, but more subversively, perhaps, the physical conflation/equation of male and female that Birgitta elsewhere in her work
insists upon spiritually.
Parentés (Paris 1987) 74, 71. Translated text is taken from Gillian C. Gill, Sexes and
Genealogies (New York 1993) 62, 59.
15
(Deinde dei filius loquebatur ad me dicens:) “Si aliquis loqueretur per fistulam
habentam tria foramina et diceret audienti: Numquam ex isto foramine audies vocam
meam, non esset arguendus, si postea loqueretur per duo reliqua foramina. Sic eciam est
nunc in locucione nostra. Nam licet mater mea virgo dixerit, quod illa esset vltima littera
mittenda regi, hoc intelligendum est de persona sua. Sed nunc ego deus, qui sum in matre
et mater in me, mitto nuncium meum regi” (8.48.18–20).
16
All biblical references are from the New American Bible.
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It is this conflation that paradoxically demonstrates Birgitta’s “indifference” to phallic authority/church hierarchy. Lacan, in “God and
Woman’s jouissance,” believes that the “perverse jouissance” expressed by feminine mysticism is beyond the phallus and thus unsignifiable. He cites as an example Bernini’s sculpture of Saint Theresa—
you only have to look at it, writes Lacan, “to immediately understand
that she’s coming ... [but] [w]hat is she getting off on?”17 Lacan makes
clear that while Saint Theresa’s jouissance is obvious, it is also inexplicable. Lacan’s interpretation depends for its success, of course, on the
objectification of the female, on her lack of agency; he sees Saint
Theresa as seductive rather than subjective. For what can Lacanian
analysis make of a woman who authorizes herself and the role(s) of
women rather than serving only as a receptacle of jouissance? How is
Saint Theresa’s sexual climax obvious to Lacan if Bernini has somehow captured her inexplicability? Irigaray insists that mysticism, while
“beyond the phallus,” is not unsignifiable: “This is not a jouissance that
women cannot know or say; rather it is a jouissance that Lacan cannot
hear for he does not know how, or even where, to listen.”18 And yet,
Lacan here anticipates later objections to Irigaray’s attempt to entirely
17
“[C]’est comme pur Sainte Thérèse—vous n’avez qu’à aller regarder à Rome la
statue du Bernin pour comprendre tout de suite qu’elle jouit ... Et de quoi jouit-elle?” In
Le séminaire, Livre XX: Encore 1972–1973 (Paris 1975) 70. Translated text is taken from
Bruce Fink, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX 1972–1973 (New York 1998) 76.
18
Grosz (n. 6 above) 175. An anonymous reader of my manuscript argues that she
finds “Irigaray’s work [and thus this essay] essentializing and embedded in paradox. To
argue for a ‘feminine language’ or discourse is to deny the negativity that structures language itself. Lacan says that ‘woman does not exist’—what he means by this is that
woman is a symptom of language’s inability to refer. Thus she becomes associated with
all that juridical discursive structures must abject in order to imagine themselves as coherent ... ‘the feminine’ is a patriarchal fantasy.” I doubt there is any way out of this
paradox, save for cutting it right through the middle. Objections to Irigaray’s essentialism
always puzzle me: is her paradoxical theorizing any more paradoxical than the often
tautological linguistic monolith put into place by psychoanalysis? There is value for
literature in the Lacanian model of behavior, chief of which may be the idea that language itself is the problem, not the sex underpinning constructions of gender. And yet, to
work with (and within) this model, Irigaray must embed herself in its self-referential
structure. Irigaray can hardly be “blamed” for essentialism when she is simply using the
master discourse. To escape the paradox, one must eschew the structure (as American
feminists have tended to do). Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, and Julia Kristeva, with varying
degrees of complicity, must necessarily subvert their own feminisms.
As Toril Moi points out, Irigaray cannot resist attempting to name the feminine,
which, according to Irigaray herself, cannot be done. And yet, Irigaray is fully aware of
her transgression, which is one reason why she is so indebted to Derrida’s serpentine
journey through language. See Jacques Derrida, particularly his remarks on citation, in
“signature événement contexte,” Marges de la Philosophie (Paris 1972).
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free women from objectification when he wonders what and where
Saint Theresa’s “coming” is from. The difficulty Irigarayan theory (and
indeed all feminist psychoanalytic discourse) faces is “positionality,”
defining a female jouissance that is neither Other nor masculine: Elizabeth Grosz suggests the feminine “cannot describe itself from outside
or in formal terms, except by identifying itself with the masculine, and
thus by losing itself.” She goes on to describe Irigaray’s strategy for
challenging Lacan’s phallogocentrism as “laughter, disinvestment of
interest, indifference presented as interest or commitment.” Irigaray
proscribes masculine discourse but cannot prescribe a feminine alternative (the effort to do so—to name, delineate, delimit—is itself a feature of masculine discourse); instead, her own theoretical writings
mimic male psychoanalytic discursive practices to achieve her feminist
ends, what Grosz calls “a strategy for utilizing ... a ‘machinery’ hostile
to one’s interests so that it works against itself.”19 Considering
Birgitta’s spiritual goals, this strategy might also be a way to mimic
male discourse without the irony or mockery typically associated with
Irigarayan discourse but with a certain spiritual joy.
Irigaray’s strategic machinations do not simply subvert Lacanian
discourse; her “Divine Women,” for example, is written with Ludwig
Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity very much in mind, and she is not
content with Feuerbach’s anthropological and essentialist explanation
of the Trinity (despite the charge of “essentialism” continually leveled
at Irigaray), even though his Trinity seems to substitute the Mother of
God for the Holy Spirit as the third aspect of the triune God, because
“the personality of the Holy Spirit is a too vague and precarious, a too
obviously poetic personification of the mutual love of the Father and
Son, to serve as the third complementary being.” Yet the Virgin’s status
is posited contingently on the Son’s masculinity in a protopsychoanalytic way: “The son—I mean the natural, human son—considered as
such, is an intermediate being between the masculine nature of the father and the feminine nature of the mother; he is, as it were, still half a
man, half a woman, inasmuch as he has not all the full, rigorous consciousness of independence which characterizes the man, and feels
himself drawn rather to the mother than to the father ... the son’s love
for his mother is the first yearning of man towards woman—his first
humbling of himself before her ... Necessarily, therefore, the idea of the
19

Grosz (n. 6 above) 175, 178 (quoting Irigaray), 187. On “positionality,” see Toril
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Mother of God is associated with the idea of the Son of God—the same
heart that needed the one needed the other also.”20
“Divine Women” takes issue with Feuerbach’s paradoxical treatment
of the Virgin: in The Essence of Christianity she is first elevated to explain spiritual mediation between Father and Son and in this way is
associated with both the Son and Holy Spirit; but because her material
aspect is female she is relegated to a male-dependent role, lacking rigor
and physical or spiritual autonomy. As Naomi Schor observes, Irigaray
seeks not to define women (“a task better ... left to men”), but to mimetically transform woman’s masquerade: “the real in Irigaray is neither impossible, nor unknowable: it is the fluid.” Schor is here speaking
of physical fluid, the “mater-ialism” of Irigaray’s scientifically-tinged
criticism of essentialist discourse, but the fluid, as Irigaray’s idée fixe,
works also figuratively to describe women’s playful reappropriation of
the feminine. That is, the fluid may be described or defined in terms of
the container that contains and thus shapes it. And yet, as Irigaray expresses it, “To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to try to recover
the place of her exploitation by discourse ... It also means ‘to unveil’
the fact that, if women are such good mimics, it is because they are not
simply resorbed in this function.”21 Birgitta, too, displays a typically
generous and canny relationship to the fluid in her Revelations. As
Birgittine scholars have long noted, she frequently refers to herself as a
conduit, or channel (canalis) for divinity, which expresses itself in figMoi, Sextual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (London 1985) 136–138, 140.
20
“[D]enn die Persönlichkeit des heiligen Geistes ist eine zu vage und prekäre, eine zu
sichtlich blos poetische Personification der gegenseitigen Liebe des Vaters und Sohnes,
als dass sie dieses dritte ergänzende Wesen hätte sein können ... Der Sohn—ich meine
natürlichen, menschlichen Sohn—ist an und für sich ein Mittelwesen zwischen dem
männlichen Wesen des Vaters und dem weiblichen der Mutter; er ist gleichsam noch halb
Mann, halb Weib, indem er noch nicht das volle, rigarose Selbstständigkeitsbewusstsein
hat, welches den Mann charakterisirt und mehr zur Mutter als zum Vater sich hingezogen
fühlt ... Die Mutterliebe des Sohnes ist die erste Sehnsucht, die erste Demuth des Mannes
vor dem Weibe.” Ludwig Feuerbach, Das Wesen des Christenthums (Suttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1960) 86, 87. Translated text is taken from The Essence of Christianity, trans.
George Eliot, intro. Karl Barth (New York 1957) 70, 71.
21
Naomi Schor, “This Essentialism Which is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray”
in differences 1.2 (1989) 38–57, 47, 50; Luce Irigaray, Ce Sexe qui n’en est pas un:
“Jouer de la mimésis, c’est donc, pour une femme, tenter de retrouver le lieu de son exploitation par le discours ... C’est aussi “dévoiler” le fait que, si les femmes miment si
bien, c’est qu’elles ne se résorbent pas simplement dans cette fonction” (Paris 1977) 74.
Translated text is taken from Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke, This Sex Which Is Not
One (Ithaca 1985) 76. And see Børreson’s analysis of the difference between the Birgittine and Julian trinities. Birgitta, unlike Julian of Norwich, does not feminize the divine,
but “divinises the female by making Mary Christotypic” (n. 2 above, 22).
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ures of thirst-quenching liquid or wine. This is a strategy by which
Birgitta can align herself not only with the Old Testament prophetic
tradition, but also with Christ as the incarnation of his Father: no one
comes to the Father but through the Son. In book 5, however (known as
The Book of Questions, Liber Questionum), with her usual imagistic
complexity Birgitta expresses the Son as the wine and Mary as the vessel.22
Irigaray’s discursive relationship with Feuerbach is far more complementary and rewarding than her relationship with Lacan; her philosophical objectives have more force than her reactions to psychoanalytic discourse. Feuerbach, much as Lacan, anticipates or grounds some
of Irigaray’s key speculations on woman’s spirituality:
Certainty is the highest power for man; that which is certain to him is the
essential, the divine. “God is love:” this, the supreme dictum of Christianity, only expresses the certainty which human feeling has of itself, as the
alone essential, i.e., absolute divine power, the certainty that the inmost
wishes of the heart have objective validity and reality, that there are no limits, no positive obstacles to human feeling, that the whole world, with all its
pomp and glory, is nothing weighed against human feeling. God is love:
that is, feeling is God of man, nay, God absolutely, the Absolute Being.
God is the optative of the human heart transformed into the tempus finitum,
the certain, blissful “IS,”—the unrestricted omnipotence of feeling, prayer
hearing itself, feeling perceiving itself, the echo of our cry of anguish.23
22
She does so to answer the first question asked in the Tenth Interrogation (i.e., why
did God choose to hide his divinity, as it were, in the flesh of humanity?); it is a response
sandwiched between the moralizing praise lavished on Mary in the Ninth Interrogation,
and the subsequent response in the Tenth that addresses God’s omnipresence and unique
ontology: “In my own self I am, who is above all and outside all, who is within all and all
within me, and without me is nothing” (“in me ipso sum, qui supra omnia et extra omnia
sum, qui intra omnia sum et in me sunt omnia et sine me est nichil,” 5.10.20). See Morris
(n. 4 above) 66–67; Børreson (n. 2 above) 25, 41; and n. 4 above.
23
Gewissheit ist für den Menschen die höchste Macht; was ihm gewiss, das ist ihm das
Seiende, das Göttliche. Gott ist die Liebe—dieser Ausspruch, der höchste des Christenthums—ist nur der Ausdruck von der Selbstgewissheit des menschlichen Gemüthes, von
der Gewissheit seiner als der allein berechtigten, d. i. Göttlichen Macht—der Ausdruck
von der Gewissheit, dass des Menschen innere Herzenswünsche unbedingte Giltigkeit
und Wahrheit haben, dass es keine Schranke, keinen Gegensatz des menschlichen
Gemüths giebt, dass die ganze Welt mit aller ihrer Herrlichkeit und Pracht Nichts ist
gegen das menschliche Gemüth. Gott ist die Liebe—d.h. das Gemüth ist der Gott des
Menschen, ja Gott schlechtweg, das absolute Wesen. Gott ist das sich gegenständliche
Wesen Gemüths, das schrankenfreie, reine Gemüth—Gott ist der in das Tempus finitum,
in das gewisse selige Ist verwandelte Optaviv des menschlichen Herzens, die rücksichtslose Allmacht des Gefühls, das sich selbst erhörende Gebet, das sich selbst vernehmende Gemüth, das Echo unserer Schmerzenslaute”; in Feuerbach (n. 20 above) 145–
146; translated text (n. 20 above) 121. On Irigaray’s relationship to psychoanalysis and
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This describes exactly the experience of mysticism, of spiritual union with God, that Irigaray discusses at length throughout her work, in
which the God of women (and of men) is “[j]ust an elusive memory
that flees representation”(“si ce n’est qu’un souvenir insaisissable qui
se dérobe à sa représentation”).24 The mystical experience “allows
femininity to discover itself precisely through the deepest acceptance of
patriarchal subjection.” In other words, there is a gap between feeling
and articulation; the former may exist purely, if mutely, but it can only
be authenticated doctrinally. This is where Irigaray’s strategy of mimicry, as outlined in (and by) Speculum of the Other Woman (Speculum
de l’autre femme), can trace the impact and effect of Birgitta’s appropriation and exegesis of biblical writings, particularly in the first book
of the Revelations. Speculum is structured like its nominal instrument;
its “central section [is] framed by the two massive sections on Freud
and Plato respectively ... as if the more fragmentary middle section
sinks between the solid, upright volumes of the master thinkers. Within
the middle section, the framing technique is both repeated and reversed.”25 It is in this middle section, entitled “Speculum,” that Irigaray
places her chapter Une Mere de Glace, a transcription of extracts from
Plotinus’s Enneads, a Neoplatonist treatise on the hierarchy of existence that had considerable impact on Christian thought. The Enneads
becomes “Irigaray’s expert (literal) imitation of them. Her perfect
mimicry manages subtly to expose his narcissistic phallocentrism.”26
Within the illuminating concavity of Speculum’s structure, Irigaray’s
mocking appropriation of Plotinus seeks to erase the privileged position
of masculine discourse, to show, by the placement of Une Mere de
Glace—so that it mirrors the discursive objects of Western thought—
that “it is, paradoxically, through the imitation of its object that the
speculum objectifies it in the first place.”27 When Birgitta begins the
Revelations appropriating the voice of God as her own, she too is
holding a mirror up to the church: if she speaks as a prophet in the Old
Testament and as Christ in the New Testament, and if her authority is
then validated by agents of the church, then her elevation of Mary and
philosophy, see Margaret Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine (London
1991) 53–54.
24
Speculum de l’autre femme (Paris 1974) 242. Translated text is taken from Gillian C.
Gill, Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca 1985) 194.
25
Moi (n. 19 above) 137, 130.
26
Moi (n. 19 above) 131.
27
Moi (n. 19 above) 130.
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calls for church reform (and it is largely through Mary that Birgitta
makes her judgments and reform demands) must likewise force those
agents to recognize their authenticity. To further confound the distinction between her voice and the voice of God, Birgitta often conflates
references to the Bible and to her own Revelations under the rubric
“book.” In book 8 of the Revelations, for example, Birgitta sees an angel and a fiend standing before a pulpit: “After this I saw a book glittering in that pulpit, as if made of the most gleaming gold and having
the form of a book. That very book was open, and its writing was not
written in ink, but every single word in the book was living and spoke
itself. No one read the writing of that book, but whatever the writing
contained, the whole of it was seen in the pulpit and in those same colors” [of which the beaming pulpit is made].28 “Justice” speaks from this
book throughout the chapter (“iusticia de libro”).
Or consider Birgitta’s revision of the Martha and Mary story, in a
long chapter from book 6 of the Revelations. The biblical account of
the two sisters, related in full in Luke 10.38–42, clearly establishes a
hierarchy of services to God that in giving preference to the contemplative life of Mary also communicates her passivity: “On their journey
Jesus entered a village where a woman named Martha welcomed him to
her home. She had a sister named Mary, who seated herself at the
Lord's feet and listened to his words. Martha, who was busy with all the
details of hospitality, came to him and said, ‘Lord, are you not concerned that my sister has left me to do the household tasks all alone?
Tell her to help me.’ The Lord in reply said to her: ‘Martha, Martha,
you are anxious and upset about many things; one thing only is required. Mary has chosen the better portion and she shall not be deprived of it.’”
Birgitta’s retelling does more than explicate the usual association of
Mary with the richer contemplative life and Martha with the active; she
makes both lifestyles “needful” and also contextualizes the active and
contemplative lives, so that the former may approach equality with the
latter:
Know therefore, that even though the part of Mary is best, nevertheless, that
28
“Post hec autem in ipso pulpito vidi librum resplendentum quasi aurum fulgentissimum et habentem formam libri. Qui quidem liber apertus erat et scriptura eius non erat
scripta atramento sed vnum quodque verbum in libro erat viuens et se ipsum loquebatur
... Scripturum quoque libri nullus legebat, sed quicquid continebat scriptura, hoc totum in
pulpito et in illis coloribus videbatur” (8.48.54–56).
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part of Martha is not evil, but praiseworthy and very pleasing to God ... But
note that Martha, when she came to me first asking for her dead brother
Lazarus, he was not brought back to life. It was only afterward, when Mary
was called and came, and then because of both sisters their brother was revived. Thus it is in spiritual life as well. For one who perfectly desires to be
Mary ought first to be Martha, laboring bodily in praise of me ...Thus I said
in the gospel that Mary chose the best part. For Martha’s part is good at that
time when she sorrows for the sins of her neighbors. Martha’s part is better
then when she labors, as those who live and stand firm wisely and honestly,
and she does this because of her love of God.29

It seems likely that Birgitta is rescuing Martha in order to authorize her
own status as wife, mother, and widow. Birgitta appropriates the voice
of Christ, just as Paul does in 1 Corinthians when he contrasts the virtues of the virgin and the wife: “I should like you to be free of all worries ... The virgin—indeed, any unmarried woman—is concerned with
things of the Lord, in pursuit of holiness in body and spirit. The married woman, on the other hand, has the cares of this world to absorb her
and is concerned with pleasing her husband” (7.32–34). By subtly rewriting Paul’s pronouncement, Birgitta is redefining the roles of
women in relation to Christ; further, she is authorizing her “carefulness” in the service of God. She continually wavered between the roles
of Mary and Martha in her own life, often agonizing over her worldly,
“active” duties, yet in the Revelations she arrives at a workable thesis
for reconciling the two. By providing a fully authorized matristic gloss
on the gospel of Luke, she revises the patristic “machinery” of Paul;
secondarily she is of course circumventing the Pauline doctrine that
forbade women to preach. Kari Elisabeth Børreson, one of the most
comprehensive readers of the Revelations, notes the “womancentred
falsifications” of the gospels in book 1, in which Birgitta rewrites Luke
1.11–20, and the Revelations are peppered with comparisons of Birgitta
to Moses and Elijah, Old Testament exemplars of, respectively, ecclesiastical law and prophecy.30
29

“Scito eciam, quod, licet pars Marie optima sit, non tamen ideo pars Marthe mala
est, ymmo laudabilis et beneplacens Deo ... Sed nota, quod Martha rogans pro fratre suo
Lazaro mortuo prior venit ad me, sed non resuscitabatur frater eius statim. Sed venit
postea Maria vocata, et tunc propter ambas sorores frater resuscitatur. Sic eciam est in
spirituali vita. Nam qui perfecte desiderat esse Maria, debet prius esse Martha laborando
in honore meo corporaliter ... Ideo ego dixi in euangelio, quod Maria optimam partem
elegit. Nam pars Marthe tunc bona est, quando dolet de peccatis proximorum. Est quoque
pars Marthe tunc melior, quando laborat, quomodo homines sapienter et honeste viuant et
subsistant, et hoc facit propter solius Dei dileccionem” (6.65.88–102).
30
Børreson (n. 2 above) 24. For relevant biographical information see Redpath (n. 10
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Perhaps the most audacious of Birgitta’s strategies, and certainly the
one that lends the most authority to her Revelations, is her selective and
pervasive use of divine law to uphold Birgittine doctrine and to pass
judgment on the saved and the damned. Divine law within the Revelations is a complex presence: it refers not only to God’s utterances
(whether spoken to her or pronounced without mediation through her)
but to the juridical processes by which Birgitta expresses doctrine. For
example, during the trial of an “ungrateful and disobedient” king in
book 8 (“ingratum ... et inobedientem”), the Virgin Mary intervenes on
the king’s behalf as he is about to be sentenced, and “To [Mary] the
judge replied: It is not just, he said, to deny you anything.” The king is
saved, and Mary ends the chapter with an explanation of God’s revelation to Birgitta—why he denies her some knowledge but legitimizes
other: “for the saints of God received the holy Spirit in diverse ways ...
But for you it is not lawful to know or to hear or to see anything except
the spiritual, and to write down and to tell what you see to those persons as you are ordered.”31
Mary’s role is more enigmatic in book 4, during another trial. After a
knight and an Ethiopian argue their cases for the judgment of a soul,32
“innumerable demons” appear and plead:
“We know,” they said, “that you are one God in three persons ... You are in
truth that charity to which are joined pity and justice ...We say more: if that
woman you value before all others, who is the Virgin who bore you and
who has never sinned; if, I say, she had sinned mortally and had died without divine contrition, thus you esteem justice so that her soul would never
have obtained heaven but would be with us in hell. Therefore, O judge, why
do you not sentence this soul to us, that we may punish it according to its
works?” ... After this was heard a sound like a trumpet’s ... and immediately
a voice was heard speaking: “Be silent and listen, all of you angels and
spirits and demons, to what the Mother of God is saying. [Mary then chasabove) chaps. 1–3; Jørgensen (n. 10 above) vol. 1, bk. 2; Morris (n. 4 above) chaps 2–4.
For a discussion of the passages in the Revelations and the Acta et processus canonizacionis beate Birgitte related to Birgitta’s comparison with biblical figures of law and
prophecy, and with Moses in particular, see Børreson 30–35.
31
“Cui iudex: Non est, inquit, iustica tibi aliquid negare ... Nam sancti dei diuersimode
acceperunt spiritum sanctum ... Sed tibi non est licitum scire alia nisi spiritualia audire et
videre et illa, que vides, scribere et dicere illis personis, quibus tibi precipitur” (8.56.93–
100).
32
Barbara Obrist writes: “In Bridget’s revelations, the Ethiopians are always those
devils which claim a soul that is being judged. When the judgment is negative and stands
as a condemnation, they lead the soul away.” “The Swedish Visionary: St. Bridget” in
Medieval Women Writers, ed. Katharina M. Wilson (Athens, GA 1984) 249 n.11.
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tises the fiends:] “O, you enemies of God! You have persecuted mercy, and
you love justice without charity. Even though this soul appears lacking in
good works, for which it ought not to gain heaven—nevertheless, see what I
have under my mantle!”

Mary lifts her mantle to reveal a “small congregation” (“modica ecclesia”) of men and women: “Then after was silence, and then the Virgin was heard speaking: ‘Scripture says: who has perfect faith shall be
able to move the mountains on the earth ... O demons,’ she said, ‘I order you by the authority of the judge to attend to these things which
you see now in justice.’”33
Bechtold describes Mary’s role here as “attorney for the defense,”
noting that “the final Word and the earthly conception of justice are
distorted by Mary ... the soul is granted a reprieve from suffering the
full impact of the Law due to Mary’s introjection of merciful silence.”34
Mary interrupts—rather than distorts—divine law, inserting a charitable if obscure silence, Irigaray’s “disruptive excess,”35 that initially
appears to reduce Mary’s mantled church to a specular, mute feminine
object (like Lacan’s Saint Theresa) but which in fact “speaks” eloquently. Through this image, and her own voice, which repeats the
word of God and reiterates Christ’s power to judge, Mary expresses a
changed, merciful, and feminized divine law.
This passage is also a clever revision of the transfiguration of Christ.
While the gospel’s revelation of Christ’s divinity depends upon the
apostles’ expression of faith, Birgitta’s Mary reveals her divine aspect
to the faithless fiends, “having under her mantle things of great importance, in secret, as it were ... a small congregation [of] women and men
33
“‘Nos,’ inquiunt, ‘scimus, quod tu unus es Deus in tribus personis ... Tu vere es ipsa
caritas cui coniuncta sunt misericordia et iusticia ... Plus dicimus: si res illa quam pre
omnibus diligis, que est virgo que te genuit et que nunquam peccauit, si, inquam, illa
peccasset mortaliter et sine contricione diuina mortua fuisset, sic diligis iusticiam, quod
anima eius nunquam obtineret celum set esset nobiscum in inferno. Ergo, o iudex, cur
non iudicas animam istam nobis, ut puniamus eam secundum opera sua?’ Post ista audiebatur sonitus quasi tube ... et statim quedam vox loquebatur dicens: ‘Silete et auscultate,
omnes vos angeli et anime et demonia, quid Mater Dei loquitur!’ ... ‘O, o inimici! Vos
persequimini misericordiam et cum nulla caritate diligitis iusticiam. Licet in operibus
bonis hic apparea<n>t defectus, pro quibus hec anima non debet obtinere celum; videte
tamen quid ego habeo sub mantello meo!’ ... Deinde factum est silencium, et virgo loquebatur dicens: ‘Scriptura dicit: Qui habet fidem perfectam potest per eam montes transferre in mundo ... O,’ inquit, ‘demones, precipio vobis ex potestate iudicis attendere ad
illa que in iusticia nunc videtis’” (4.7.17–32).
34
Bechtold (n. 2 above) 95.
35
Grosz (n. 6 above) 179.
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and friends of God, religious and other” (“habens sub mantello suo
quasi occulte res aliquas magnas ... modica[m] ecclesia[m] ... mulieres
et viri amicique Dei religiosi et alii,” 4.7.25–27). This emblematic
revelation of Mary is opposed to the open, male, and patristic apparition Christ presents to the apostles.36 In the gospel accounts of the
transfiguration Jesus leads his apostles to the top of a mountain: “He
was transfigured before their eyes and his clothes became dazzlingly
white—whiter than the work of any bleacher could make them.37 Elijah
appeared to them along with Moses; the two were in conversation with
Jesus... A cloud came, overshadowing them, and out of the cloud came
a voice: ‘This is my Son, my beloved. Listen to him ...When they heard
this the disciples fell forward on the ground, overcome with fear. Jesus
came toward them and laying his hand on them, said, ‘Get up! Do not
be afraid.’”38
In the Revelations, Mary’s mantle is not transfigured per se; she lifts
it herself to reveal a congregation devoted to her. Her presence, like
Christ’s in the gospels, is a mediating one that banishes fear from the
godly soul; when God commands the witnesses to hear her, however,
she responds not only with a Christlike silence, but also with her interpretation of divine law. After the fiends witness Mary’s charity, Christ
sanctions her interpretation of justice: “When this was spoken to them,
the demons fled” (“Quibus dictis demones fugierunt,” 4.7.35). Yet in
Birgitta’s most cunning transfiguration of Scripture in this passage,
Mary speaks the words by which, in the gospels, Christ had banished
the devil: the Revelations’ Mary tells Birgitta, “Scripture says: who has
36
See Holloway (n. 9 above) 56 n. 21 for the frequency of this emblem; see also
Bynum’s examples of typical medieval religious iconography, in Fragmentation and
Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York
1992); and Elizabeth Robertson’s analysis of the uses of the female body in Julian of
Norwich’s writings: “Medieval Medical Views of Women and Female Spirituality in the
Ancrene Wisse and Julian of Norwich’s Showings” in Feminist Approaches to the Body in
Medieval Literature, ed. Linda Lomperis and Sarah Stanbury (Philadelphia 1993).
37
For more of Birgitta’s clothing imagery see, for example, 4.9; see also Cumming’s
Revelations 2.26. Book 2 of the Revelations in Latin has not been published in print yet,
although it is available online, along with the other books, at the Birgitta and her Revelations website; this is a very informational site, packed with links to other mystics’ sites,
books of scholarly and lay interest, and online articles. See the references to books 2 and
8 online, and note also Birger Bergh’s online remarks regarding the differences between
the print and electronic versions of these books, the latter of which follows the 1492
Ghotan text.
38
I have used primarily Mark 9.2–7 for the transfiguration story; for the passage in
which Jesus tells his apostles not to fear and for the story of Christ’s casting out of the
devil I have used Matthew 17.6–7 and 18–20.
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perfect faith shall be able to move the mountains on the earth.” In the
transfiguration story of Matthew, when Christ and his apostles come
down from the mountain they are met by a man whose son is possessed
by an evil spirit. Christ rebukes the devil and casts him out, after the
disciples fail to, and then explains their failure as a lack of faith: “I assure you, if you had faith the size of a mustard seed, you would be able
to say to this mountain, ‘Move from here to there,’ and it would move.
Nothing would be impossible for you.” Once again Birgitta is rewriting
gospel indifferently; her triune Virgin judges as the Father, mediates as
the Mother, commands as the Son—Mary is not only an aspect of the
godhead but displays all three divine aspects in the revelations she
claims as lawful for Birgitta.
There is another, overarching juridical quality to Birgitta’s life and
works, peripheral to the eight chief books of the Revelations by which
she is known—her establishment of a feminine genealogy. Grosz
writes:
The mother/daughter relation is the “dark continent of the dark continent,
the most obscure area of the social order” ... [which] covers over the debt
culture owes to maternity but cannot accept ... Man’s self-reflecting Other,
God, functions to obliterate the positive fecundity and creativity of women
... the phallocentric reduction to maternity ... implies ... her subjection to the
Law of the Father, her subsumption under the name of her husband, and her
giving up her identity as a woman.39

Irigaray puts it this way: “Respect for God is possible as long as no one
realizes that he is a mask concealing the fact that men have taken possession of the divine, of identity, of kinship.”40
Birgitta establishes her nonsubjection to the Law of the Father,
masking it as subjection, and thus she renews her identity as a sacred
woman. As Holloway notes, the final section of Birgitta’s Vita, written
by her confessors shortly after her death, “muddles together the categories of wife and widow”41 so as to take advantage of Birgitta’s status as
worldly widow and spiritual bride. In other words, Birgitta co-opts
marriage for her own purposes: chastity is preferable to marriage, yet a
chaste, spiritual marriage to Christ is not only a singular example of
39

Grosz (n. 6 above) 181.
Gill, Sexes and Genealogies (n. 14 above) v. “Le respect de Dieu est possible tant
qu’il ne devient pas évident qu’il masque une appropriation du divin, de l’identité, de la
parenté par les seuls hommes,” Irigaray, Sexes et parentés (n. 14 above) 7.
41
Holloway (n. 9 above) 6.
40
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Christ’s husbandry of the church, but also sanctifies the state of earthly
marriage. Throughout the Revelations Birgitta worries about the secondary status accorded to married life by the church fathers, yet her
spiritual union with Christ retroactively elevated her physical union
with Ulf, and her earthly marriage refined her commitment to Christ,
particularly as Birgitta used marriage as an opportunity to urge her husband to greater piety, perfect the management and rhetorical skills she
would need in Rome, and practice something of the self-indulgence and
haughtiness that made her later asceticism sweeter and more humbling
to her.
But Birgitta is one element of a mystical kinship of women, a network for which she was largely responsible, and by which women and
men might share in her feminine divine. Her establishment of the Order
of the Most Holy Savior for women and men, as well as her influence
on contemporary female visionaries, helped create a Christianity contiguous to male Christianity, sometimes subverting it and sometimes
supporting it, but faithful to the ideal Irigaray describes in terms of
fluidity and fluctuation: “We women, sexed according to our gender,
lack a God to share, a word to share and to become ... we are in need of
... our elementary sentence, our basic rhythm, our morphological identity, our generic incarnation, our genealogy ... It is equally essential that
we should be daughter-gods in the relationship with our mothers ...
Does respect for God made flesh not imply that we should incarnate
God within us and within our sex: daughter-woman-mother?”42
Mother, daughter, and granddaughter form another, secular kind of
trinity within the Revelations, as Birgitta explores her role as a daughter
and mother in conversation with the Virgin. In book 6, Mary reproaches the pride of women, to which Birgitta responds as a proud
woman: “Our mother also sat with the nobility, in the finest clothes,
having many servants and nourishing us with honor. Why oughtn’t I
inherit this for my daughter, who has certainly learned to bear herself
42
Gill, Sexes and Geneologies (n. 14 above) 71. “Il nous manque, nous sexuées selon
notre genre, un Dieu à partager et à devenir ... il nous manque ... notre phrase élémentaire, notre rythme de base, notre identité morphologique, notre incarnation générique,
notre généalogie ... Il est indispensable aussi que nous soyons filles-dieux dans la relation
à notre mère ... Respecter le Dieu fait homme, n’est-ce pas incarner le Dieu en nous et en
notre genre: fille-femme-mère,” Irigaray, Sexes et parentés (n. 14 above) 83–84; see also
“Les femmes, le sacré, l’argent” in Sexes et parentés 89–102; and Je, Tu, Nous: por une
culture de la différence (Paris 1990), chaps. 1 and 2; and René Girard, La Violence et le
sacré (Paris 1972), chaps. 1–2. See also Morris’s biography (n. 4 above) 109–113.

“I AM THE CREATOR”

37

nobly and to live with joy of the flesh, to die with great honor in the
world?” (6.52.17–18). In this lengthy and poignant chapter Birgitta
wrestles with her own feminine legacy while struggling to bequeath a
different kind of morality to her daughter.43
Two of Birgitta’s daughters, Katherine and Ingeborg, were sent to
the Cistercian convent at Risaberga for their education; Ingeborg (to
whom Birgitta is referring in conversation with Mary) died a Cistercian
nun. Katherine married and, following her mother’s example, attended
to her duties as the wife of a prominent man while encouraging her
husband to lead a life of prayer, penance, and abstinence. In 1350
Katherine joined her mother in Rome, where Birgitta had gone on pilgrimage, and Birgitta asked her to stay there with her, devoting her life
to Christ. Katherine agreed. God told Birgitta that Katherine was the
spiritual coworker he had promised her earlier. It appears that God
compensated Katherine’s husband for his loss by granting him an early
death; thus widowed, Katherine vowed not to remarry but to assist her
mother, and the two worked together, sometimes fractiously, until
Birgitta’s death. It fell to Katherine to press for her mother’s canonization, to run the order based at Vadstena and manage the faithful who
had followed the two women from Rome intending to join it, and to get
confirmation from Rome of Birgitta’s Regula, the rules she had written
to run her order (delayed because, among other reasons, Katherine
would not submit to changes suggested by Urban VI). This last was
accomplished after Katherine’s death, and by the fifteenth century convents run according to Birgitta’s written rule had been founded all over
Western Europe.44
Birgitta’s Order was founded “per mulieres primum et principaliter,”
“for women first and principally.”45 Beyond creating a personal, feminized God, Birgitta created a Christianity linking her with God and
with other women. In “Women, the Sacred, Money,” Irigaray claims
that women desire to set up a “different social order” and, to fulfill that
43
See Cumming’s translation history, Revelations xiii–xvi. On the relationship between Birgitta and Katherine, see also Morris’s biography (n. 4 above) 109–113.
44
See Redpath (n. 10 above) esp. 73–82; Jørgensen (n. 10 above) vol. 2, bks. 7–8;
Morris (n. 4 above) 109–113; note that in Jørgensen’s work Birgitta’s daughter in known
as Karin (Morris transcribes her name, more familiarly, as Katarina). See also Holloway’s chronological chart (n. 9 above) xii–xiv; Harris (n. 4 above) 13–98; and the final
third of Birger Gregersson and Thomas Gascoigne, The Life of Saint Birgitta, trans. Julia
Bolton Holloway (Toronto 1991).
45
Quoted in Holloway (n. 9 above) 8.
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desire, need “a religion, a language and a currency of exchange, or else
a nonmarket economy. These conditions are in fact closely linked.”46
The mystical women whose visions and writings flourished throughout
the medieval period explored and revised these conditions of faith and
existence, and Birgitta remains the most innovative circulator of their
particular currency. While male mystics experiencing divine revelations were seen themselves as occupying a feminine state (passive, silent, emotional), the revelations of the women evolved into a distinct
discourse, a way of exchanging information among and about women,
using a language and imagery modeled upon that used by men, but reencoding the rhetoric. Thus, while women were assumed to be likelier
receptors of mystical visions (as, variously, children or the insane have
been considered likelier prophets),47 they used their more direct “access” to divinity to reauthorize holy writ. Because the majority of visionary writings by women were dictated to male scribes and scrutinized by male ecclesiastics, their work is considered ultimately to support church hierarchy. But once the revisionary value of these texts is
accepted, then men become the agents circulating a feminine discourse—or, at least, providing ecclesiastical women with the opportunity to construct their own divinity.
Birgitta and her successors at Vadstena were not entirely successful
in convincing the papacy of their order’s orthodoxy (and thus the orthodoxy of its Regula, despite the guarantee of Mary in book 4 of the
Revelations and of Birgitta’s confessors and biographers). Even by
Birgittine standards, the Regula was an incendiary document, its
“Mariocentric identification decidedly feminist, trespassing the boundaries of ecclesiastical androcentrism.”48 And yet, the Revelations had
been authenticated by her confessors, even though Birgitta claimed
more for her gynocentric God than other mystics. For example, Birgitta
46
Gill, Sexes and Genealogies (n. 14 above) 79. “Pour accéder à une organisation sociale différente, il faut aux femmes une religion, un langage, une monnaie d’échange ou
une économie non marchande. Ces conditions sont d’ailleurs apparentées,” Irigaray,
Sexes et parentés (n. 14 above) 93. For more on Irigaray’s relationship to the symbolic,
and thus to her understanding of a feminine genealogy, see Whitford, chap. 4. For more
on Birgitta’s influence in England, see Johnston (n. 4 above). For more on Birgitta’s
influences on both male and female mystics during her lifetime, and the rise of mysticism
in the fourteenth century, see Obrist (n. 32 above) 227–237; Bynum, Fragmentation (n.
36 above) chaps. 4–6; and Margaret Wade Labarge, A Small Sound of the Trumpet:
Women in Medieval Life (Boston 1986), chaps. 5, 6, and 10.
47
See Bynum, Fragmentation (n. 36 above) 134 and 188–189.
48
Børreson (n. 2 above) 54; see also 51–55; and Morris’ biography (n. 4 above) 106–
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experienced participation in Christ’s nativity, like Gertrude the Great,
Marie d’Oignies, Hadewijch of Brabant, Adelheid of Frauenberg, and
other visionaries. Unlike others’ visions of participation, however,
Birgitta’s is typically unambiguous, detailed, and complex. She (or the
divinity speaking through her) expresses her devotion in metaphors of
maternity (a common motif in visionary writing), is present at Mary’s
recreation of the birth of Christ (a vision Mary had earlier promised to
give her), or, in book 6, simulates the physical pregnancy and birth in
her heart rather than in her womb.
The mother of God said to the betrothed: “Daughter, you wonder at this
motion that you feel in your heart. You ought to know that this is not an illusion, but a manifestation of something similar to the sweetness and compassion given to me. For just as you are ignorant of the way the motion in
your heart came to you so suddenly and with exultation, thus the coming
into me of my son was wondrous and sudden. For when I consented to the
angel who announced the conception of the son of God, immediately I
sensed in me something wondrous and living. And when he was born from
me, he came forth from my closed maiden womb with unutterable exultation and miraculous quickness. Thus, daughter, do not fear an illusion but
be thankful, for this movement you feel is a sign of my son’s coming into
your heart. As my son assigns to you the new name of his bride, so I call
you my daughter-in-law. For your father and mother, growing older and
more quiet, are placing the burdens on the daughter-in-law, and they tell her
there are things to be done in the home, just so God and I do things—by our
charity—in the old and indifferent hearts of the people. We wish to show
our friends and the world our will through you.”49
109.

49
“... mater Dei et dixit sponse: ‘Filia, miraris de motu, quem sentis in corde tuo.
Scias, quod non est illusio sed ostensio quedam similitudinis dulcedinis mee et misericordie michi facte. Nam sicut tu ignoras, quomodo tam subito tibi cordis exultacio et
motus aduenit, sic aduentus filii mei in me mirabilis fuit et festinus. Nam quando ego
consensi angelo nuncianti michi concepcionem filii Dei, statim sensi in me mirabile
quoddam et viuidum. Et cum nasceretur ex me, indicibili exultacione et mirabili festinancia clauso meo virginali vtero prodiebat. Ideo, filia, non timeas illusionem sed gratulare,
quia motus iste, quem tu sentis, signum aduentus filii mei est in cor tuum. Ideo, sicut
filius meus imposuit tibi nomen noue sponse sue, sic ego voco te nunc nurum filii mei.
Nam sicut pater et mater senescentes et quiescentes imponunt nurui onus et dicunt ei ea,
que sunt facienda in domo, sic Deus et ego in cordibus hominum senes et frigidi a caritate
eorum indicare volumus amicis nostris et mundo per te voluntatem nostram’” (6.88.3–7).
See Sahlin’s response to this vision and to Birgitta’s maternity in the Revelations, in “‘A
Marvelous and Great Exultation of the Heart’: Mystical Pregnancy and Marian Devotion
in Bridget of Sweden’s Revelations” in Hogg (n. 12 above) 1.108–109; and see Børreson
(n. 2 above), who calls Birgitta’s vision of pregnancy “completely exceptional” 39. Børreson’s tone here (and throughout her lengthy essay) is unusual. Her thesis suggests that
Birgitta’s influence is less subversive than feminist scholars would like to make it, and
yet she herself admits to Birgitta’s singularity and audacity in any number of areas.
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Despite the singularity of this message from the Virgin, visions of
maternity were not experienced exclusively nor even primarily by
women; neither were the symbiotic pregnancies associated primarily
with Mary, but rather with Jesus. As with their spiritual writings and
the liturgy common to their religious orders, the visions expressed by
women borrowed and adapted those expressed in communities of men.
Complex cultural changes during the patristic and early medieval periods paved the way for a changed conception of Christ and an expanded
role for his mother Mary, but the rationale behind individual experiences of the Son as mother figure is fairly clear: maternity is associated
with unqualified love, nurturance, the inextricability of physical pain or
effort with emotional pleasure, and with the fleshly unity that at one
time made mother and child inseparable entities. But Birgitta’s maternal visions are, without exception, associated with Mary (even though
Birgitta’s Christ expresses love for his church in traditional maternal
terms). By envisioning Mary as the generative entity and spiritual authority—to the extent that Mary not only allegorizes Birgitta’s faith by
her pregnancy, but makes Birgitta her and God’s spiritual successor—
Birgitta’s vision neatly contradicts the physiological commonplace of
the period, reflected in other visionary writing, by which the female
generates the fleshy matter of the fetus and the father the spiritual matter.50
Birgitta is clearly unique among visionary women. Those who would
deemphasize the heterodoxy of her religious writings and practices
might consider one of Feuerbach’s observations in The Essence of
Christianity on the subjectivity of the man-God relationship: “And
thus, in reality, whatever religion consciously denies ... it unconsciously restores in God. Thus, in religion man denies his reason ... he
can only believe what God reveals to him. But on this account the
50
Carolyn Bynum’s Jesus as Mother (Jesus as Mother: Studies in the Spirituality of
the High Middle Ages [Berkeley 1982]) is perhaps the most important study of gender in
medieval spirituality in recent years; see in particular chap. 4, and also Bynum’s discussion of Bernard of Clairvaux’s “conception of the father as disciplinarian,” vis-à-vis
Christ as nurturing figure (116), a duty that Birgitta’s Mary also appropriates. It is interesting to consider how much more “affective” (and Bynum has much to say about this
term, 129–135) these fluid gender conceptions of the divine are in pictorial representations (and for these, see the numerous figures Bynum has collected in Fragmentation and
Redemption, n. 41 above); it becomes easier then to understand how resistant modern
scholars were, until recently, to clearly seeing these emblems, as opposed to reading them
as they occurred in patristic and monastic writing. One can read Jesus as mother allegorically; when one sees a figure of Christ giving suck to his faithful, however, one must
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thoughts of God are human, earthly thoughts”51 (one is again reminded,
inversely, of Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.11–12: “Who, for example, knows
a man’s innermost self but the man’s own spirit within him? Similarly,
no one knows what lies at the depths of God but the Spirit of God”). It
is difficult to speak of Birgitta as merely an agent of the church and
impossible to speak of her as an independent entity. Throughout her
life, as she worked toward her personal, spiritual, political, and monastic goals, she simply joined her will with God’s and went her own way.
Whether confronting a divided papacy, or castigating King Magnus for
his alleged homosexual inclinations, or demanding an end to the Hundred Years’ War, or substituting community affections for parental affections, Birgitta received from God those things she was denied as a
fourteenth-century religious woman. By sublimating her earthly impulses in the service of God she was able to channel those impulses, her
beliefs, and idiosyncrasies in order to change a rich internal relationship
and a visionary rule into a reality per mulieres primum et principaliter.52
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reconcile this image with our culture’s comparatively rigid gender roles.
51
“Uns so setzt denn auch wirklich die Religion Alles, was sie mit Bewusststein
verneint,—vorausgesetzt natürlich, dass dieses von ihr Verneinte etwas an sich Wesenhaftes, Wahres, folglich nicht zu Verneinendes ist,—unbewusst wieder in Gott. So
Verneint der Mensch in der Religion seine Vernunft: er weiss nichts aus sich von Gott,
seine Gedanken sind nur weltlich, irdisch: er kann nur glauben, was Gott ihm geoffenbart. Aber dafür sind die Gedanken Gottes menschliche, irdische Gedanken.” In Feuerbach (n. 20 above) 33–34; translated text, 27.
52
I would like to thank Professors David Allen and Jane Bishop for their great help
with the Medieval Latin translations.

